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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1955
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The bulk of interesting decisions in the constitutional field during
1955 involved the time-honored due process of law issue. Procedural and
substantive problems in this area presented some fresh grain for the old
mill.
The method of conducting a hearing was under fire in two widely di-
vergent cases. A municipal Civil Service Commission ordered a police
chief removed from office. At the hearing upon which the order was
based the chief was not permitted to deny under oath the specific charges
brought against him. This denial was a violation of due process of law
and the commission's order was reversed.' Another type of hearing, con-
ducted by the State Fire Marshal in the manner of a private investigation to
determine the cause of a fire, permitted a lower due process of law standard.
The marshal could call a witness to testify without benefit of counsel.
Refusal to testify legally supported a contempt imprisonment even under a
habeas corpus attack.? This type of hearing is permitted under the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section
10 of the Ohio Constitution. It is an investigatory hearing only and not an
order-producing hearing. Even under such an investigatory hearing, how-
ever, the witness cannot be compelled to testify. He may assert his privilege
against self incrimination if first sworn.
In another case, however, the privilege against self incrimination was
denied. A person who failed to answer a question of the Ohio Un-Ameri-
can Activities Commission cannot plead the protection of the fifth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. In the first place this protection
only applies against the federal government. No state constitutional right
was involved, for a state statute provided the witness immunity from
prosecution if he answered the questions. Ohio need not be concerned
with the possibility of another sovereign power, like the federal govern-
ment, using the witness' answers to proceed against him criminally. A
,contempt conviction for failure to answer was therefore held to be con-
stitutional.a
The constitutional authority for an administrative tribunal (State
Board of Real Estate Examiners) to revoke the license of a real estate
broker was upheld even where the Board made additional findings of fact
other than those alleged in the complaint. It was not a denial of due
process to make such findings and to include them in the revocation order.'
'Smith v. City of Mayfield Heights, 124 N.E.2d 761 (Ohio App. 1955).
'k; re Groban, 164 Ohio St. 26, 128 N.E.2d 106 (1955).
'State v. Arnold, 124 N.E.2d 473 (Ohio Com. P. 1954).
'Meneley v. Carpenter, 129 N.E.2d 516 (Ohio App. 1954).
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The Board in such action had acted within the standards established by the
legislature.
The retroactive effect of judicial decisions which overrule prior, de-
cisions was also considered from the due process point of view last year.
An application for a certificate of abatement of claimed overpayment of
franchise taxes was validly denied.5 The applicant had relied on a judicial
decision which was subsequently overruled in another case. Where no
showing was made of any rights vesting in the applicant prior to the over-
ruling decision, procedural due process was accorded in denying the appli-
cation for abatement. Furthermore the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment was not violated, for this clause does not assume
uniformity in judicial decisions.
An unusual procedural issue involving a plea of guilty was also con-
sidered in 1955. The accused at first pleaded guilty, and the court duly
journalized the plea. Then the court, on defendants' motion, vacated the
plea and permitted the accused persons to plead not guilty. Thereafter the
court vacated the not guilty plea, reestablishing the prior plea of guilty. No
consent of the defendants made in open court was obtained for this last
courtaction. This action was held to be illegal, a violation of the defendants'
right -to due process of law.6
Substantive due process issues clustered primarily about the "petty
larceny of the police power." Property rights were constitutionally taken
from a person under a zoning regulation when mandamus was denied to
compel a building commissioner to issue a permit. The zoning ordinance
required forty feet of frontage on a street before a building could be erected
on a lot. The petitioner had acquired two tracts adjacent to his original
lot. These two tracts had no frontage on any street. In fact, because of a
ravine, no street could be constructed on which these two -lots could have
frontage. To deny a construction permit because the zoning provisions
were not met was held not to deny due process under the fourteenth
amendment nor to constitute an illegal taking of property under sections
1, 16 and 19 of Article I of the Ohio Constitution.7  Furthermore it was
held not to be a violation of the protection of property envisaged under the
due process clause for the legislature to make the parent or the parent's
estate liable for the support of an adult child -who is an inmate of the state
hospital for the mentally ill.8
Two decisions reported in 1955 did protect property from an illegal
taking under the due process clause. A zoning ordinance which restricted
'The Peerless Electric Co. v. Bowers, 164 Ohio St. 467, 129 N.E.2d 467 (1955).
'State v. Evola, 130 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio App. 1955).,
'State ex rel. Jack v. Russell, 162 Ohio St. 281, 123 N.E.2d 261 (1954).
'State v. Webber, 163 Ohio St. 598, 128 N.E.2d 3 (1955).
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to residencetise land-located on the corner of two heavily traveled -highways
where other corners were zoned for commercial use was held to have- no
reasonable relation to public health and welfare under the state's police
power. Such zoning violated the fourteenth amendment due process pro-
vision, for the land had "little suitability" for residence use.9 An ordinance
authorizing confiscation of pinball machines which register a score was also
held unconstitutional. 10 Gambling devices per se can be confiscated;
operation of pinball machines can be made illegal. To confiscate property
such as pinball machines which are -not in themselves gambling devices,
however, is too extreme and violates the property protection contemplated
under due process of law.
The traditional liberties expressed in the first amendment to the United
States Constitution were scrutinized at the highest and lowest levels of the
Ohio judicial hierarchy last year. The Supreme.Court had little difficulty
in sustaining municipal legislation for fluoridation of the public water
supply. To prevent dental caries was considered a public health purpose.
Individual freedom, religious or otherwise, contemplated by the first
amendment and the fourteenth amendment would not be violated., Prior
exercise of the state's police power in areas of venereal disease, blood tests
for marriage, sterilization of mental defectives, pasteurization of milk. and
chlorination of water had opened the path for the current public health
program involving fluoride in the water supply. A taxpayer's suit to en-
join fluoridation was denied." The common pleas court wrestled with
the constitutionality of movie censorship which continues to be a volatile
public matter. By denying motion picture interests an injunction to re-
strain movie censorship the court relied on -the traditionally broad .discre-
tion given to equity courts as courts of conscience.12  The court held that
the motion picture interests have legal rights but these alone were not
enough to move equity to act. The court faced the confusing constitu-
tional status presented -by the United States Supreme Court decisions. In
Burstyn Inc. v. WibonI3 the New York state movie censorship law which
prohibited "sacrilegious" films was held unconstitutional by the nation's
highest tribunal. In the following year, the Ohio Supreme Court in Su-
perior Films Inc. v. Department of Education14 upheld Ohio's movie cen-
sorship law which required films to be moral, educational or amusing and
harmless. On appeal to the United States Supreme Court this decision was
' State ex rel. Euverard v. Miller, 129 N.E.2d 209 (Ohio App. 1954).
"- Ferguson v. City of Columbus, 128 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio App. 1954).
'Krause v. City of Cleveland, 163 Ohio St. 559, 127 N.E.2d 609 (1955).
"RIKO. Pictures v. Hissong, 123 N.E.2d 441 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1954). -
"343 U.S. 495 (1952).
"159 Ohio St. 315, 112 N.E.2d 311 (1953).
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reversed per curiam on -the authority of the Bursyn case.15 The common
pleas court refused to accept the implication that the United States Supreme
Court had held unconstitutional Ohio's movie censorship law. It stated:
This court cannot accede to the proposition of law that an express
decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio can be overruled by implication.
If the United States Supreme Court desires to overrule a decision of the
Supreme Court of Ohio, a sovereign state, let it so declare in express terms
such intention."'
The separation of powers among the three branches of government was
reemphasized theoretically again last year. In practical operation the court
acknowledged the paramount right of a court of general jurisdiction to
occupy space in the courthouse essential for the proper and efficient opera-
tion of the court. To dispossess offices of the legislative or executive func-
tion, however, the court must demonstrate that additional space is rea-
sonably necessary, not merely desirable.17
Two cases held that the legislature improperly delegated authority to
administrative officers because no standards or criteria were established
which the officers could follow. One of these cases proved most contro-
versial. A municipal zoning ordinance allowed a gasoline station in a re-
tail business district only upon condition that a variance permit be obtained
from the zoning Board of Appeals. A majority of four judges held this
provision unconstitutional because of the failure to establish standards
and denied the mandamus action for a variance permit.18 Three judges
dissented and contended that the decision was in conflict with a prior de-
cision which had upheld a similar zoning ordinance. This prior ordinance
in a different municipality permitted the Board of Appeals to grant a vari-
ance permit where "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship" would
result to the property.'? One of the dissenters in the instant case would
have denied the mandamus action because the plaintiff had an adequate
equitable remedy. In 'the second case involving an improper delegation
of authority it was held invalid to give power to a state hospital adminis-
trator to admit or not to admit a mental patient of seventy years or over
without any standards being established.20
Specific issues concerning the Ohio constitution faced the courts in
three instances last year. The right of a common pleas judge to hold
"346 U.S. 587 (1954).
'R.K.O. Pictures v. Hissong, 123 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ohio Com. P1. 1954).
' State ex rel. Finley v. Pfeiffer, 163 Ohio St. 149, 126 N.E.2d 57 (1955).
'State ex rel. Selected Properties Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 N.E.2d
371 (1955).
' The L & M. Investment Co. v. Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, 180 N.E. 379 (1932).
'State ex rel. Songer v. Baber, 97 Ohio App. 501, 127 N.E.2d 538 (1954).
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